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Abstract : 
This paper presents new homogeneous series on top shares of income from 
1920 to 2000 in Canada using personal income tax return data. Top income 
shares display a U-shaped pattern over the century, with a precipitous drop 
during World War II, followed by a slower decline until 1970. Since the late 
1970s, top income shares have been increasing steadily and the very top shares 
are now as high as in the pre-war era. As in the United States, the recent 
increase in top income shares is the consequence of a surge in top wages and 
salaries. The parallel evolution of top income shares in Canada and the United 
States, associated with much more modest marginal tax rate cuts in Canada, 
suggests that the upward trend in top shares in Canada since the late 1970s 
cannot be explained by tax cuts. Further evidence suggests that the upward 
trend in Canada derives from the United States, perhaps because many 
Canadians have an emigration option.  
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The evolution of inequality during the process of development has 
attracted enormous attention in the economics literature. Many authors have tried 
to analyze whether changes in inequality are mostly due to changes in technical 
progress. The Kuznets curve theory is perhaps the most famous example of such 
an analysis. Kuznets (1955) proposed that income inequality should follow an 
inverse-U shape, first rising with industrialization and then declining, as more and 
more workers join the high-productivity sectors of the economy. As alternatives to 
this technological explanation of inequality patterns, many studies have analyzed 
whether macro-economic business cycles, government interventions such as tax 
policy and redistributive programs, or more generally labor market institutions 
(such as unions) and regulations can have a sustained impact on inequality or 
explain the time or cross-country patterns in inequality. Understanding better the 
forces driving inequality is of critical importance to assess the role of government 
in regulating or shaping the distribution of income and welfare but requires 
analyzing long-term series of inequality. This study proposes to cast light on this 
issue by constructing and analyzing income inequality series for Canada over the 
20
th century. 
In many instances, income tax statistics are the only source on income 
distribution available on a regular annual basis for extended periods of time 
before micro-economic surveys on incomes became available in the 1950s or 
1960s, and remain the best source to study upper income groups. However, 
income tax statistics cover only taxpayers and thus for some earlier years only 
the top of the income distribution can be analyzed using tax return data, for 
example the share of total income accruing to the top decile or top percentile. 
Recent studies have used income tax statistics to construct inequality time 
series for various countries over the course of the 20
th century (Piketty 2001a, b 
for France, Piketty and Saez, 2003 for the United States, and Atkinson, 2001 for 
the United Kingdom). All these studies have found dramatic declines in the top 





the last two or three decades: an almost complete recovery in the United States, 
some recovery in the United Kingdom and no recovery in France. The timing of 
the downturns and upturns suggests that pure technological explanations cannot 
account for the facts, although other explanations are still tentative.  
An important question that arises is whether the level of top income 
shares is mainly driven by changes in the tax system. The Canadian situation 
might cast interesting new light on these issues because of the proximity and 
similarity of the Canadian and American economies associated with a divergent 
tax experience in these countries over the last three decades. Therefore, 
analyzing the Canadian case may offer an opportunity to assess whether fiscal 
developments are the main factor driving the pattern of top income shares. 
This study uses Canadian income tax statistics from 1920 (the first year 
such statistics were produced) to estimate homogeneous series of income 
shares for various upper income groups within the top decile. As personal 
income taxes in Canada are based on individual income (not family income), our 
series measure inequality among individuals rather than families. In order to 
understand the evolution of these top income shares, we analyze changes in 
their composition, primarily from 1946 (the first year details on composition of 
incomes by income bracket became available). Finally because the evolution of 
top incomes over the last 20 years is driven mostly by changes in labor income, 
we also construct employment income shares accruing to top wage earners 
since 1972, primarily using a large microdata set of tax returns that is only 
available for more recent years. 
Our estimated top shares series show that, similar to the French, British, 
and American experiences, top income shares in Canada experienced a 
dramatic drop during World War II with no recovery during the next three 
decades. However, in contrast to the U.S. experience, top income shares in 
Canada were not negatively affected by the downturns of the inter-war period. 
Over the last 20 years, top income shares in Canada have increased 
dramatically, almost as much as in the United States. However, this drastic 





percentile of the Canadian income distribution and thus can only be detected with 
tax return data covering very high incomes. As in the United States, the increase 
is largely due to a surge in top wages and salaries. As a result, the composition 
of income in the top income groups has also shifted dramatically in Canada since 
World War II: many more high income individuals derive their principal income 
from employment instead of as a return to capital.  
Many authors have argued (see e.g., Slemrod (1996, 1998) and Gordon 
and Slemrod (2000)) that the surge in top incomes in the United States may not 
reflect real changes in inequality but rather changes in the way incomes are 
reported for tax purposes induced by reductions in marginal tax rates. The 
Canadian experience casts doubt on this view in part because Canada 
experienced a more modest reduction in tax rates than the United States and yet 
experienced a similar surge in top incomes. We present further evidence 
suggesting that the surge in top incomes in Canada might have derived from the 
United States as many Canadians have an option to leave Canada to work in the 
United States. If this brain drain threat explanation is correct, this would imply 
that the surge in top incomes in the United States has been real as well because 
it could not have impacted top incomes in Canada otherwise.
1 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the full set of 
Canadian income tax statistics has been exploited to construct long-term series 
on inequality in Canada.
2 Blackburn and Bloom (1993) summarize a number of 
studies that examine both individual and family income inequality in Canada in 
the post-war period. The view that emerges from their summary is that from the 
late 1940s to the 1980s, there were alternating small increases and decreases in 
income inequality with not much overall change. None of these studies examines 
                                                 
1 The question of whether the surge in top U.S. incomes is due to supply side effects following the 
tax cuts (Feldstein, 1995) or to non-tax related effects (Slemrod and Bakija, 2001, Piketty and 
Saez, 2003) is still debated. The Canadian evidence could be consistent with either explanation.  
2 Professor A.B. Atkinson has recently and independently produced preliminary distributional 
series within the top decile of the Canadian income distribution since World War II using Income 
Tax Statistics. Atkinson’s series focus on inequality within the top decile (such as the share of the 
top decile income accruing to the top percentile) and not on top income shares relative to the 
average in the population as we do here. Buse (1982) also used Canadian tax statistics from 
1947 to 1978. However, his analysis focused on the effects of the business cycle and 





high incomes or the war/pre-war period because they use survey data. Heisz, 
Jackson and Picot (2001) summarize more recent Canadian inequality research, 
including the well-known contribution by Beach and Slotsve (1996).  They find 
that there is some evidence of growing male and family earnings inequality but 
also emphasize the findings of Wolfson and Murphy (2000) that with respect to 
income after tax and transfers, the inequality "gap" between Canada and the 
United States grew between 1974 and 1997. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data sources 
and outlines our estimation methods. In Section 3, we present and analyze the 
trends in top income shares and the evolution of the composition of these top 
incomes. To cast further light on the recent period, Section 4 presents series of 
top wages shares since 1972. Section 5 discusses to what extent income tax 
changes can explain the patterns we obtain and compares these results with the 
American experience. Finally, Section 6 offers a brief conclusion.  All series and 
complete technical details about our methodology are gathered in appendices of 
the working paper version of the paper (Saez and Veall, 2003).  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 
In this section, we describe briefly the data we use and the broad steps of 
our estimation methodology. Our estimates are from personal income tax return 
statistics compiled annually by the Canadian federal taxation authorities since 
1920.
3 Before World War II, because of high exemptions, only about 2 to 8 
percent of individuals had to file tax returns and therefore, by necessity, we must 
restrict our analysis to the top 5% of the income distribution.
4 Beginning with 
World War II we can extend our analysis to the top decile, which we divide into 
finer fractiles. Following Piketty (2001a, 2001b) and Piketty and Saez (2003), in 
                                                 
3 Personal income taxation started in 1917 in Canada. However, the fiscal administration did not 
produce distribution statistics for the first three years 1917 to 1919. Canadian personal income 
tax statistics have been published in The Canada Yearbook in the pre-war period and in Taxation 





addition to the top decile (denoted by P90-100), we have constructed series for a 
number of higher fractiles within the top decile: the top 5% (P95-100), the top 1% 
(P99-100), the top 0.5% (P99.5-100), the top 0.1% (P99.9-100), and the top 
0.01% (P99.99-100). This also allows us to analyze the five intermediate fractiles 
within the top decile: P90-95, P95-99, P99-99.5, P99.5-99.9, P99.9-99.99. (See 
Table 1 for data on these fractiles as well as the average income level in each 
group and the number of tax units in each group all for 2000, the latest year 
available.) Each fractile is defined relative to the total number of adult individuals 
(aged 20 and above) in the Canadian population. This number is computed using 
population census statistics and should not be confused with the actual number 
of tax returns filed. Column (1) in Table 2 reports the number of adult individuals 
in Canada from 1920 to 2000. The adult population has increased from about 5 
million in 1920 to almost 23 million in 2000.  
The income definition we use is a gross income definition before all 
deductions and including all the income items reported on personal tax returns: 
salaries and wages, self-employment and small business net income, partnership 
and fiduciary income, dividends, interest, other investment income, as well as 
other smaller income items. Realized capital gains are not an annual flow of 
income (in general, capital gains are realized infrequently in a lumpy way) and 
form a very volatile component of income with large aggregate variations from 
year to year depending on stock price variations. Moreover before 1972, capital 
gains were not taxable and hence not reported on tax returns. Therefore, we 
focus mainly on series excluding capital gains.
5 Our income definition is 
computed before personal income taxes and personal payroll taxes but after 
employers’ payroll taxes and corporate income taxes. 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 We can provide estimates for the top 5% for all years because it is always the case that more 
than 5% of singles file a return, as opposed to married individuals, for whom the exemption 
threshold was higher. (See appendix section B in Saez and Veall (2003) for details.) 
5In Saez and Veall (2003), in order to assess the sensitivity of our results to the treatment of 
capital gains, for the period 1972 to 2000, we compute for each fractile (defined by ranking 
incomes excluding capital gains) the percentage of additional income reported in the form of 
realized capital gains. We also recompute our top income shares including realized capital gains 
in income (both for the ranking and the levels and shares computations). For the period 1972-





Our principal data consist of tables of the number of tax returns, the 
amounts reported, and the income composition (since 1946), for a large number 
of income brackets. As the top tail of the income distribution is very well 
approximated by Pareto distributions, we can use simple parametric interpolation 
methods to estimate the thresholds and average income levels for each  fractile.   
We then estimate shares of income by dividing the income amounts 
accruing to each fractile by total Personal Income computed from the National 
Accounts.
6 Our income denominator is taken as 80% of Personal Income not 
including transfers from the National Accounts.
7 The average income (per adult) 
series is reported on Column (2) of Table 2. This series is reported in real (2000) 
Canadian dollars. Our CPI deflator used to convert current incomes to real 
incomes is reported in Column (3). Average real income per adult has  increased 
fivefold from 1920 to 2000. The Great Depression decreased real income by 
about one third. World War II was a period of high income growth. Average 
income grew steadily from 1950 to 1976. Since then, average real income has 
increased very little with downturns from 1981 to 1983 and from 1990 to 1993.  
After we have analyzed the top share data, we will also analyze the 
composition of income, concentrating on the period since 1946 when 
composition data were first published. Using this published information and a 
simple linear interpolation method, we decompose the amount of income for 
each fractile into employment income, entrepreneurial income (self-employment 
and small business income), and capital income (excluding capital gains).  
Large microfiles of tax returns (covering 20% of the total population) are 
available beginning in 1982. These microfiles allow us to produce top wage 
shares series for the period 1972 to 2000.
8 In this case, fractiles are defined 
                                                 
6 Using tax returns to compute the level of top incomes, and using national accounts to compute 
the total income denominator is standard in historical studies of income inequality. For example, 
Kuznets (1953) adopted this method in his famous study on American inequality. All the National 
Accounts series we use in this study are from CANSIM (2003).  
7 Personal Income is higher than total income from tax returns because it includes non-taxable 
items such as imputed rent, imputed interest, etc. In the recent years in which virtually all adults 
with income file tax returns, total income from tax returns has always been very close to 80% of 
Personal Income net of transfers. 
8 Top wage shares for 1972 to 1981 are estimated using the number of tax returns reporting 





relative to the total number of individuals with positive wages and salaries. 
Wages and salaries include exercised stock options. Estimating the pattern of top 
wage shares is critical to understanding the pattern of top income shares over 
the last two decades in Canada. 
   




The basic series of top income shares are presented in Table 2. Figure 1 
displays the income share of the top 5% (P95-100) from 1920 to 2000. The top 
5% share displays sharp fluctuations up to the end of World War II (between 30 
and 40% of total income) and is much more stable afterwards (around 25%). 
Before WWII, the fluctuations are strikingly counter-cyclical. The top share 
increases sharply during each downturn episode of the inter-war period: the 
sharp depression of 1920-1921, the Great Depression from 1930-1933, and the 
pre-WWII downturn of 1937-1938. The top 5% share tends to decrease during 
the recoveries from the downturns (1921-1923, 1933-1935, and WWII), although 
the pattern is less pronounced than for the downturns. The top 5% share 
declines drastically during the WWII years from almost 40% in 1938 to less than 
25% in 1945.
9 This drastic reduction implies that the average income in the top 
5% dropped from 8 times the average income before WWII to just 5 times the 
average income in 1945. After WWII, the top 5% share declines very slowly (with 
very small fluctuations) from 25% to 22% by the mid 1980s. However, in the last 
20 years, the top 5% share has gone up substantially to about 29% in 2000, but 
is still substantially below its level just before WWII. 
Therefore, the Canadian evidence suggests that the twentieth century 
decline in inequality took place in a very specific and brief time interval, namely 
the World War II years. This evidence is very much in line with the French 
                                                 
9 As we will see in Section 5, in the United States, the fall in top income shares does not start 





(Piketty, 2001a,b), American (Piketty and Saez, 2003), and British (Atkinson, 
2001) findings. Moreover, the pattern of the sharp upturns and downturns in the 
pre-war period suggests that the business cycle was the main driving factor in 
these fluctuations. In any case, the traditional Kuznets inverted U-curve theory of 
inequality does not fit well with the Canadian experience.  
In order to understand the overall pattern of top income shares, it is useful 
to decompose the top decile into three groups, P90-95, P95-99, and the top 
percentile P99-100. The share of income accruing to these three groups is 
depicted in Figure 2. Three important facts should be noted. First, the counter-
cyclical pattern before World War II appears to be stronger for P95-99 than for 
the top percentile. Second, the drop during WWII is larger for the top percentile 
(from 18% in 1939 to 10% in 1945) than for P90-95 and P95-99. Third, the upturn 
during the last two decades is concentrated in the top percentile (which 
increased from about 7.5% in the late 1970s to 13.5% in 2000). The P90-95 
share did not increase at all from the late 1970s and even the P95-99 share 
increased by less than one percentage point during the same period.  
  Examination of the very top groups (P99.9-100 and P99.99-100) in Figure 
3 reinforces these three empirical findings. The higher the group, the sharper is 
the decline during World War II, and the sharper the recovery since the late 
1970s. The very top group shares experience a drop of more than 50% from 
1938 to 1945. Moreover, and in contrast to lower groups, the drop continues after 
World War II until the mid-1970s. As a result, the average individual in the top 
0.01% had an income more than 200 times the average income in the adult 
population in 1920. In 1972, that individual had an income only 40 times higher 
than average. However, since the late 1970s, the very top groups have almost 
recovered their pre-World War II levels so that by 2000, average income in the 
top 0.01% is about 190 times the average income. 
The concentration of the rise in top shares in the very top groups explains 
why it appears to have gone unnoticed in the literature. Tax returns are the only 
data that allow the analysis of groups within the top percentile. The concentrated 





workers casts doubt on the skill-biased technology explanation (see Acemoglu, 
2000). We will return to this issue in our analysis of top employment income 
shares in the last three decades. We also note that there is a short-term spike in 
top shares in 1989, and that this spike is bigger for the very top groups. We 
believe that this is evidence of a (transitory) response to the marginal tax rate 
flattening consistent with the findings of Sillamaa and Veall (2001). We will 
discuss the important issue of the effects of taxation on reported top incomes in 
Section 5. Finally, the very top groups do not display the same counter-cyclical 
behavior as other high income groups. The top 0.01% share declined during the 
1920-1921 downturn and did not increase during the Great Depression. 
 The remainder of the paper will be aimed at understanding the three key 
facts: the counter-cyclical pattern of top shares (except the very top share) in the 
pre-war period, the sharp fall of top shares during World War II (with the most 
dramatic decline at the very top) with no recovery after the war, and the surge in 
top income shares over the last 20 years (characterized by an extreme 
concentration at the top). In order to progress in our understanding, we now turn 
to the analysis of the composition of incomes reported by the top groups.     
  
3.2. The Composition of Top Incomes 
 
For Canada from 1920 to 1945, detailed composition of income is not 
available in personal income tax data and only tables showing the distribution of 
taxpayer occupations (defined by principal source of income) are available. This 
evidence is summarized in Saez and Veall (2003). It shows that between two 
thirds and four fifths of taxpayers were classified as employees during the inter-
war period, a time when less than 5% of adults filed tax returns. This suggests 
that well compensated employees formed a very important fraction of the top 5% 
of income earners, and probably the overwhelming majority of the upper middle 
class group P95-99. This is the pattern that arose in the analysis of France 
(Piketty 2001a,b) and the United States (Piketty and Saez, 2003) and will be 





explain why the P95-99 share is so clearly counter-cyclical in the pre-war period. 
The sharp downturns of the pre-war period were associated with sharp deflations 
(see column (3) in Table 2). Assuming wages are in general nominally rigid in the 
short-run, those who are able to keep their jobs during the recession experience 
a relative gain. This might explain why the P95-99 share increases so much 
during the downturns (and goes down during the recoveries). The top 1%  of the 
income distribution contains many more entrepreneurs and capital income 
earners
10 (as confirmed by occupation tables by income bracket that were 
published for 1942)  and hence their share is less counter-cyclical.
11 
Our Canadian top share series display a sharp drop during World War II, 
and that drop is larger for the very top groups. This fall can be in part explained 
by the fiscal shock in the corporate sector. As part of financing the war, Canada 
increased substantially taxes on corporations.
12 Moreover, corporations reduced 
their payout ratios during the war because of the high demand for investment, 
and perhaps also to avoid the personal income tax which imposed extremely 
high marginal tax rates (in excess of 90%) on the highest incomes. This is 
illustrated in Figure 4. Panel A displays the real aggregate value of profits before 
and after taxes, along with dividend distributions of Canadian corporations from 
the National Accounts for the period 1926 (the first year the data are available) to 
1955. The figure shows that, in spite of a two-fold increase in profits from 1938 to 
1945, real dividend payments actually decreased slightly. This explains why top 
income rentiers experienced a sharp drop relative to the fast growing average 
adult income during the World War II episode (see column (2) in Table 2). Panel 
                                                 
10 The occupation tables from the pre-war period indicate that a substantial fraction of very top 
income earners in Canada were receiving most of their incomes through personal corporations. A 
personal corporation, first developed in 1925, was a corporation that was controlled by a single 
person or family and that derived at least one quarter of its profits from passive investments. It 
was taxed only at the personal level (similarly to an S-corporation in the United States today).     
11 Even then almost half of the top 0.1% were employees explaining why the top share was not 
procyclical in Canada, in contrast to the case in the United States (Piketty and Saez, 2003) and 
France (Piketty, 2001). Also as Figure 4 will show, unlike their U.S. counterparts, Canadian 
corporations tended to maintain dividend payments during the Great Depression which also 
limited the downturn in income accruing to the top percentile.     
12 While during the war the corporation income tax itself increased modestly from 15% to 18%, an 
additional tax was introduced of the greater of 22% of total profits and 100% (part refundable after 





B in Figure 4 displays the share of total capital income (excluding capital gains), 
and the share of dividends from Canadian corporations in total personal income 
in the Canadian economy from 1926 to 2000. Consistent with the evidence in 
Panel A, the share of domestic dividends in personal income falls by more than 
60% from 1938 to 1945. Moreover, the share of total capital income (including 
interest income and distributions from Canadian-owned foreign stock) falls from 
over 12% in 1938 to about 6-7% at the end of the war. These figures show 
clearly that capital income accruing to individuals was sharply reduced during the 
war and this might explain why top incomes fell so much in relative terms.   
However, the shares of income groups P90-95 and P95-99 also fell during 
World War II. The evidence from occupational tables in the pre-war period and 
from 1946 on (see below) shows that these groups are composed largely of 
employees. Therefore, it seems salaries of highly compensated employees must 
have fallen relative to average earnings in the economy. Indirect evidence 
confirms those results. Since 1915 for the Canadian manufacturing sector, data 
are available on the number and total employment income of salary earners 
(supervisory and office employees with a compensation contract determined at 
the annual level) and non-salaried employees (workers with a compensation 
contract determined either at the hourly, daily, or weekly level). Saez and Veall 
(2003) show that salary earners gained significantly relative to non-salaried 
employees in terms of employment and compensation during the downturns of 
1920-21 and the Great Depression but lost significantly during World War II. 
These results are consistent with our other findings for this period and particularly 
support the hypothesis that a compression in wage income inequality took place 
in Canada during the war years.
13  
From 1946 on, detailed tables on the composition of income were 
published annually. Therefore, for each fractile within the top decile, we were 
                                                 
13 The most direct explanation (The Canada Yearbook, 1948) was that war labor regulations set 
strict bounds on the raises that corporations were able to give to their high-salary employees. For 
example, raises for employees with salaries above $7,500 (corresponding roughly to percentile 
P99.5)  required direct approval of the Minister. Similar evidence of wage compression has been 
found for the United States (Goldin and Margo, 1992, Goldin and Katz, 1999, and Piketty and 





able to construct series on the composition of incomes. These series are 
presented in Table 3. Figure 5 shows the composition of income for each fractile 
in 1946 (Panel A) and 2000 (Panel B). As expected, Panel A shows the share of 
wage income is a declining function of income and that the share of capital 
income (dividends, interest, and other investment income) is an increasing 
function of income. The share of entrepreneurial income (professional and 
business income) presents an inverted U-shape, and peaks for fractile P99.5-
99.9. Thus, individuals in fractiles P90-95 and P95-99 rely mostly on labor 
income (capital income is less than 25 percent for these groups) while individuals 
in the top percentile derive most of their income in the form of passive capital 
income (mostly dividend and estate income). However, as was found in the 
occupation tables for 1942, even within the very top groups, wage and salary 
income remains important. In France and the United States at that time, the 
share of wages and salaries was much lower at the top than in Canada. 
Panel B shows that the income composition pattern has changed 
significantly from 1946 to 2000. In 2000, the share of wage income has increased 
for all groups, and this increase is larger at the very top. Entrepreneurial income 
(professional and business income) has fallen sharply, especially at the top. The 
share of capital income (dividends, interest, and other capital income, excluding 
capital gains) has slightly increased below the top 0.5% and fallen significantly 
for the very top groups. Therefore, both the self-employed or small business 
owners in the bottom of the top percentile, and the capital income earners in the 
very top, have been in large part replaced by highly compensated employees.  
Finally, two facts show that the decline of the share of capital income for 
the top 0.5% reflects a fall in large capital holdings (relative to the average) rather 
than a decline in the aggregate capital income in the economy. First, the share of 
capital income actually increases for the groups P90-95, P95-99, and P99-99.5, 
showing that top capital income earners have indeed lost relative to the other 
groups. Second, Panel B of Figure 4 shows clearly that the share of capital 






income and dividends in personal income from the National Accounts is not lower 
in 2000 than it was in the pre-war period. We will come back to this in Section 5. 
We saw in Section 3.1 that top income shares have increased dramatically 
over the last 20 years in Canada, and that this increase was concentrated within 
the top 1%. At the same time, we have shown that the share of wages has also 
increased dramatically for groups within the top 1%. Therefore, there is a strong 
presumption that the recent upturn in top shares is the consequence of an 
unprecedented surge in the pay of the top compensated employees. In order to 
cast direct light on this issue, we analyze in the following section the top of the 
wage income distribution since 1972.   
 
4. Wage Income Inequality Since 1972 
 
4.1. The Canada/United States Comparison 
 
To examine recent trends in the distribution of wage income (defined as 
the employment earnings of any type of employee), we use microfiles of tax 
returns, available from 1982, supplemented with extrapolations based on 
composition tables published for the years 1972 to 1981.  Our top groups are 
now defined relative to the total number of individual taxfilers who report positive 
wage income. Table 4 reports the total number of wage income earners (column 
1), and the average real annual wage income per wage earner (column 2), as 
well as the top wage income shares for the period 1972 to 2000.  
Figure 6 displays the share of wages accruing to the top decile of the 
wage distribution. The top 10% wage share has increased steadily over the 
period from about 25% in the 1970s to 33% in 2000. This increase parallels 
closely the increase of about 6-7 percentage points in the top 10% of the total 
income distribution that we analyzed in Section 3.1.
14 Figure 7 decomposes the 
                                                 
14 The level of the top 10% wage share is significantly lower than the level of the top 10% income 
share. This is due to the fact that non-wage income is more unequally distributed than wage 





top decile into three groups (P90-95, P95-99, and P99-100). It shows that, 
exactly as with the total income shares, the increase is concentrated within the 
top percentile. The shares of P90-95 and P95-99 are almost flat and increase by 
less than one percentage point while the top 1% share doubles from around 5% 
in the late 1970s to over 10% in 2000. 
Panels A and B of Figure 8 illustrate the extreme concentration of this top 
wage surge. The top 0.1% wage share (Panel A) increased more than four fold 
from about 1% to 4.3% over the period and the top 0.01% wage share (Panel B) 
increased even more dramatically from 0.2% to 1.5%.
15  Therefore the top 0.01% 
of wage earners in 2000 (comprising about 1,400 individuals) earned about 150 
times the average wage; the comparable ratio in 1972 was 20. This dramatic 
change follows closely the evolution of top income shares that we documented in 
Section 3.1. Therefore, this evidence shows that the surge in top wages led to a 
drastic shift in the composition of top incomes away from capital income and 
toward labor income, as well as to a dramatic increase in top income shares.
  
The United States experienced a similar surge in top wage incomes 
(Piketty and Saez, 2003).
16  One possible explanation might be that the two 
economies have experienced very similar technological change and thus 
distributions of earnings in both countries follow a similar path. A second possible 
explanation for the parallel pattern at the top might be competition for highly 
skilled executives driven by the U.S. market. Canadian executives and other 
professionals can relatively easily move and find jobs in the United States as part 
                                                                                                                                                 
significant fraction of which have no incomes (for example non-working spouses), while the top 
10% wage share is based on employed individuals only. 
15 Saez and Veall (2003) report calculations at the family level (which are possible with the 
microdata) that show that the increase in inequality in family wage income is slightly greater.  
16 The surge in top wage shares in the United States started earlier (in the early 1970s) and was 
not as concentrated as in Canada so that it was significant for the upper middle class P95-99 
group. As a result, in contrast to the Canadian case, studies using survey data such as the 
Current Population Survey were largely able to document the surge in high wages (see Katz and 
Autor, 1999 and Acemoglu, 2002 for recent surveys of these U.S. studies ). 
Another very important difference between the United States and Canada is the pattern 
of inequality at the bottom. Low income earners have lost dramatically in the United States 
relative to Canada, explaining why overall inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient have 
increased much more in the United States than in Canada (see Blackburn and Bloom, 1993, and 





of what is sometimes called the brain drain. Therefore, the only way for Canadian 
firms to retain their best paid employees might be to increase their salaries.  
The brain drain threat explanation seems more convincing to us than the 
technology explanation for a number of reasons. First, there is a problem in 
determining exactly what might be meant by technological change. But suppose 
the underlying notion is a broad economy-wide change such as improvements in 
information technology. As we have mentioned this would seem to suggest that 
gains would be distributed more broadly across Canadian highly-skilled workers, 
rather than be so concentrated at the very top. Second, European countries 
experienced the same change in technology as did Canada and the United 
States. However, Piketty (2001a, b) has demonstrated that France has not had 
an increase in inequality at the top of the wage distribution.
17 Third, if the 
migration threat explanation is true, then groups with higher mobility costs (or 
smaller benefits from moving) should experience a smaller rise in their 
compensation. Three pieces of evidence suggest that this is the case.  
First, the surge in inequality at the top is more concentrated in Canada 
than in the United States. The benefits from moving are clearly higher for the 
very top wage earners (who experienced the greatest increase in compensation 
in the United States, both in absolute and relative terms). Therefore, a model with 
fixed costs of moving would suggest that those at the very top in Canada are 
more likely to move than those in the upper middle class (below the top 
percentile). As a result, U.S. driven competition should be stronger at the top, 
producing a more concentrated rise in inequality in Canada than in the United 
States, as we observed in the data. Finnie (2002) finds that international 
migration is in fact much more likely among those with high incomes.
18 
                                                 
17 British top income shares have increased significantly as well since 1980 although less than in 
the United States or Canada (see Atkinson, 2001). Consistent with the migration threat 
explanation, we expect higher mobility between the United Kingdom and the United States than 
between continental Europe and the United States. 
18 This is in contrast to the small and mixed income effects he finds for interprovincial migration 
(Finnie, forthcoming) and consistent with the bivariate comparisons in Graph 7 of Finnie (2001) 
where he reports that for 1996, 0.89% of Canadians with incomes in excess of $150,000 migrated 






Second, the surge in top income shares started earlier in the United 
States than in Canada. Figure 9 displays the top 0.5% wage share for the United 
States and Canada since 1972. The top wage shares were very similar in the 
United States and Canada in the early 1970s but the U.S. top share started 
increasing almost 10 years earlier, remaining somewhat higher in 2000. Iqbal 
(1999) documents the brain drain and notes that emigration of high-income 
Canadian workers to the United States increased during the 1980s and 
especially after 1995 when the North American Free Trade Agreement allowed 
high skilled workers to receive temporary work visa permits much more easily. 
The brain drain pressures from the United States therefore correspond closely to 
the increase in top wage shares in Canada, suggesting that the latter might well 
have been driven by the former.  
Third, the French speaking community in Quebec may be more reluctant 
to move to the United States because of language and other cultural differences. 
Finnie (2002) finds that Quebec francophones are much less likely to migrate 
internationally than residents of other provinces and than Quebec anglophones. 
This is consistent with research (Finnie, forthcoming), which finds a similar 
pattern in interprovincial migration. As a result, we would expect brain-drain 
pressures to be weaker for Quebec francophones than for others in Canada. 
Figure 10 displays the top 1% wage share for francophones in Quebec and for 
Canadians in all other provinces from 1982 to 2000.
19 Figure 10 shows indeed 
that the rise in the top 1% share has been much more modest for francophones 
in Quebec (from about 4.5% to 6.5%) than for the rest of the provinces (from less 
than 6% to more than 11%).
20 Moreover, anglophones in Quebec as a group 
experience a surge in top wage shares as in the rest of the provinces.
21 This 
evidence is consistent with the brain drain threat explanation and is more difficult 
                                                 
19 Francophones are defined as those who complete their income tax returns in French. 
20 Complete series for each group within the top decile (reported in Saez and Veall, 2003) display 
similar patterns. Very top incomes have also increased significantly for francophones (although 
much less than for non-Quebec residents). A model where francophones have a higher fixed cost 
of moving than anglophones on average would produce such results if the fixed cost (measured 
in dollars) is independent of income. 
21 Within Quebec anglophones, the top 1% share increases from less than 7% in 1982 to over 





to reconcile with the pure technological change explanation: we would expect 
technological change to spread very quickly across Canadian provinces.  
 
4.2. Stock Options 
   
The surge in top executive compensation in the United States is due in 
large part to the development of stock options. In Canada, the development of 
stock options has been slower because they do not receive as favored overall tax 
treatment (Klassen and Mawani, 2000).
22 In contrast to the United States, profits 
from stock-option exercises can be separated out from wages and salaries on 
Canadian income tax returns. In spite of the unfavorable tax treatment, Saez and 
Veall (2003) document that stock options exercises, which represented less than 
0.1% of total employment income before 1990, represent about 1.5% of 
employment income in Canada in 2000. They show that stock options are 
extremely concentrated toward the top end of the wage income distribution. 
Stock options, however, like realized capital gains, are not an annual flow of 
income. As a result, top wage income shares produced, as we did, by ranking 
taxpayers including stock options might be upward biased as those with stock 
options have incomes that are unusually high in that particular year. Saez and 
Veall (2003) show, however, that even excluding stock options from wage 
income, top wage income shares would still have increased dramatically since 
the 1970s. Since 1978, the top 0.1% share would have increased by a factor of 
3.5 if stock options were completely excluded instead of by a factor of 4.3 with 
stock options fully included. Therefore, the development of stock options can only 
                                                 
22In the United States, profits from stock-option exercise are deductible from profits for the 
corporation and taxed like wage income for the individual. In Canada, stock options profits are not 
deductible for corporations and are in effect taxed very similarly to capital gains for most 
individuals upon exercise (but are fully reported and included in wages and salaries in the income 
tax statistics we have used). In effect, 75% of stock-option exercise gains are taxable from 1990 
to 1999 (50% before 1988, and 66.6% in 1988 and 1989). Over the course of 2000, the share of 





explain a small fraction of the rise in top wage shares over the last 25 years 
although it can explain a larger fraction of the surge since 1995.
23 
 
5. The Role of Taxation and Comparison with the United States 
 
The empirical literature on behavioral responses to taxation has shown 
that taxes can have a substantial impact on income reported for tax purposes, 
the variable which is the focus of this study. Therefore, it is important to consider 
changes in the income tax system in parallel to the evolution of top income 
shares. Figure 11 presents for 1920 to 2000 the marginal personal income tax 
rate applicable at various percentiles of the income distribution, along with the 
top marginal tax rate.
24    
  Before World War II, Figure 11 shows that taxation changes do not appear 
to have been that substantial, except for the very top rate, which applied to 
extremely few individuals.
25 The figure also shows how sharply tax rates jumped 
during World War II and we have emphasized the effect that this change may 
have had, in conjunction with war-time wage controls, in initially depressing top 
income shares as in Figure 2. However it is much harder to discern the impact of 
marginal tax rate changes since WWII. For someone at the P90 or P99 
thresholds, Figure 11 shows that tax rates climbed very substantially (25 to 35 
percentage points) between 1950 and 1980 and then leveled off, with a drop in 
1988 at the P99 threshold and a fairly substantial decline from 1995 to 2000 for 
those at the P90 threshold. But from Figure 2 it can be seen that for the top share 
groups up to the P99 threshold, there appears to have been almost no change in 
income share over the entire 1950 to 2000 period. 
                                                 
23 More generally, Baker and Solon (1999) and Beach, Finnie and Gray (2003) have used tax-
based data to conclude that the overall increase in annual earnings inequality in Canada was not 
due to increased earnings variability. In future research we intend to determine whether this 
finding applies to the sample restricted to top earners.  
24 In Canada, provincial income taxes represent a very significant portion of total income taxes. 
Therefore, Figure 11 displays marginal tax rates including both the federal and provincial income 
taxes (see appendix section E in Saez and Veall (2003) for details). 
25 For example, in the early 1920s, the top marginal tax rate was in excess of 70% but the 
taxpayer at percentile P99.99 (approximately the 500
th highest income in Canada at that time) 





Have marginal tax rate changes had more effect on the top percentile 
since World War II? For the United States, Feenberg and Poterba (1993, 2000) 
and Feldstein (1995) argue that large decreases in the marginal tax rates for top 
groups have given rise to the surge in top incomes depicted in Figure 12.  Also 
for the United States, various studies have pointed out that the dramatic surge in 
top incomes in the 1980s might not reflect actual income changes but rather 
changes in the way incomes are reported (see e.g. Slemrod, 1998 and Gordon 
and Slemrod, 2000). For example, Slemrod (1996) shows that about one third of 
the jump in the top income shares in the United States from 1986 to 1988 is due 
to shifts from the corporate sector to the personal sector (as the top personal tax 
rate became lower than the corporate tax rate after 1987). The Canadian 
experience casts new light on these issues.  
One central difference between the Canadian and U.S. experience is that 
Canadian marginal tax rate cuts have been much smaller. From the early 1960s 
to 2000, as Figure 11 shows, an individual at the P99.9 threshold received no 
marginal tax rate cut and an individual at the P99.99 threshold received a cut of 
just 8 percentage points. We have calculated the comparable cuts in the United 
States as over 30 percentage points at the P99.9 threshold and over 40 
percentage points at the P99.99 threshold. 
Figure 12 does show that the U.S. top income surge has so far been 
larger. There is perhaps also some indication that Canadian top shares started to 
increase during the 1980s at the time of some significant Canadian marginal tax 
rate cuts, although some of the effect seems to have been temporary (see 
below). But it is striking that between 1990 and 2000, top shares surged very 
similarly in both countries, particularly after 1995. This occurred even though 
there was very little further change in Canadian marginal tax rates facing these 
top income individuals (compare the larger marginal tax rate reduction at the P90 
level where there was no surge) and even though there was a substantial 
increase in the relevant U.S. marginal personal income tax rates in 1993 (as 
emphasized by Slemrod and Bakija, 2001, and Piketty and Saez, 2003). 





have been induced by changes in Canadian tax legislation alone
26 and 
particularly unlikely to be only the consequence of changes in tax reporting 
behavior.
27 If, as tentatively argued in the previous section, some of the surge in 
Canadian top incomes is due to brain drain threats, it must be the case that the 
surge in top U.S. wage incomes is real and not entirely due to changes in the 
way incomes are reported for tax purposes. Otherwise, those changes in the 
United States could not have increased incentives for Canadian top earners to 
move to the United States. 
There are other things to learn from the Canada/United States comparison 
in Figure 12. First, as noted, there is clear evidence in Canada, as in the United 
States, of a short-term response to cuts in marginal tax rates. For example 
Figure 11 shows that there was a substantial tax cut in Canada in 1988 and 
Figure 12 shows a sharp increase in the 0.5% share between 1987 and 1989, 
which is partially reversed by 1990. The top wage series display the same spike 
in 1989 (Figure 8) suggesting that this short-term response was in large part a 
wage income phenomenon, with highly compensated employees shifting some of 
their compensation into the lower tax rate years. Goolsbee (2000) has 
documented similar effects for the U.S. tax increase of 1993. Sillamaa and Veall 
(2001) analyzed the Canadian tax cut of 1988 by comparing incomes in years 
1986 and 1989. Consistent with our results, they found significant and large 
elasticities for high-income groups. However, our top share series shows that 
their elasticity estimates capture the short-term spike response but that this likely 
overstates the long-run response to the tax change.
 28  
                                                 
26 The corporate income tax rate remained relatively stable from the 1950s to 1987, slightly above 
50%. The corporate income tax rate was decreased from 1987 to 1990 to about 45%, and has 
remained stable until 2000. If anything, this small decrease should have induced a shifting out of 
the personal sector toward the corporate sector.   
27 In contrast to the United States, the share of business income reported on high income tax 
returns has been relatively stable and very low, between 1 and 3% of total income over the last 
20 years in Canada (see Table C3 in Saez and Veall, 2003). This shows that shifts between the 
corporate and non-corporate sector cannot explain the surge in top incomes in Canada. It is also 
important to note that, in Canada and in contrast to the United States, there was a dividend tax 
credit system throughout this period which reduced double taxation of dividends. 
28 Sillamaa and Veall (2001) use four years of the same microdata set used as part of this study. 
They find much lower tax responsiveness for low-income groups, consistent with the U.S. findings 





Second, in Sections 3 and 4 we argued that the drop in top income shares 
during World War II was a combination of a reduction in wage income inequality 
(probably due to WWII wage controls) and a reduction in distributed dividends 
because of the fiscal shock in the corporate sector during the war. Figure 12 
shows that the same drop in top shares took place in the United States and it is 
plausible that the same mechanisms were at play in both countries.
29 The 
absence of recovery after WWII suggests that the top capital income earners 
were never able to reconstitute fortunes as large (relative to the average income) 
as in the pre-war period. As argued in Piketty and Saez (2003) in the case of the 
United States, the most natural and realistic explanation seems to be progressive 
taxes. The wealth that contributed to the top 0.01% of incomes observed in the 
inter-war period was accumulated during a time when progressive taxes hardly 
existed. The fiscal situation faced by wealth-holders during and after WWII in 
Canada has been substantially less favorable. As shown in Figure 11, groups 
within the top 0.1% consistently faced personal income tax rates between 50 and 
60% after the war. In addition, the corporate tax rate was low before the war 
(around 10 to 15%) and was consistently around 40-50% after the war. 
Furthermore, there were progressive estate taxes in Canada with top rates as 
high as 50% in 1941 until these were eliminated over the 1970s. 
Since the 1970s, the burden of taxation on large capital incomes has been 
reduced with the repeal of the estate tax and the extension of the dividend tax 
credit (which reduces substantially the burden of corporate taxation on distributed 
profits), and the reduction of the top income tax rates. However, it is important to 
recall that the recent surge in top income shares is mostly a wage income 
phenomenon and top capital incomes have not yet recovered to their pre-war 
levels. Nevertheless, the dramatic surge in top wage shares, together with a 
                                                                                                                                                 
provincial level aggregate data over 1972-1996 and find a large tax responsiveness for high-
income individuals, but only for the 1988-1996 period.  
29 Moreover in the pre-war era, as discussed in Section 3, the top share in the United States 
declines during the Great Depression while it increases in Canada. This is explained by the larger 
share of wage income in top shares in Canada and the fact that there was less change in 
aggregate dividends in Canada than in the United States. Note also that the World War II effect 
starts earlier in Canada than the United States as Canada enters World War II in 1939, two years 





more favorable fiscal environment for the rich, may allow the working rich to 
accumulate large fortunes. As a result, we may very well observe a revival of top 




This paper has used personal income tax data to construct homogeneous 
series of top income shares in Canada over the course of the 20
th century. A 
number of important findings have emerged. First and most striking are the close 
parallels between the patterns and composition of top incomes in Canada and 
the United States. Both countries experienced a sharp drop in top shares during 
World War II with no recovery before the 1970s. However, during the last two 
decades, the top groups have recovered their pre-war levels. Moreover both 
countries have experienced the same shift in the composition of top incomes 
(although this change is less dramatic in Canada than in the United States): until 
the 1960s, the very top incomes in both countries were mostly composed of 
passive capital income. However, the dramatic increase in top income shares 
over the last 20 years is due to a surge in the top wages and salaries. As a 
result, today earners of employment income have, to a large extent, replaced 
rentiers at the top of the income distribution.    
The Canadian experience casts interesting light on the role of taxation in 
explaining the pattern of top income shares. Although the drop in marginal tax 
rates since the 1970s has been much more modest in Canada than in the United 
States, the surge in top incomes has been almost as large in Canada as in the 
United States. The analysis of top Canadian incomes is more transparent 
because it is not plagued with shifts between the personal and corporate sectors, 
which have made the U.S. results more difficult to interpret. Moreover, the 
concentration of the surge in the last decade and among only the very top 
income shares suggests that tax changes in Canada cannot explain the facts. 
While clear evidence of short-term responses to taxation can be found in 
Canada, it would be very misleading to equate such responses to the permanent 





 The surge in top wage shares in the last two decades took place in both 
the United States and Canada but not in other modern economies such as 
France (Piketty, 2001a,b) or Japan.
30 Therefore, simple skilled-bias technological 
explanations cannot account fully for these facts. The surge in top wages in 
Canada is more concentrated within very top groups than in the United States 
and was much less pronounced for francophones in Quebec. This suggests that 
the threat of migration to the United States by highly skilled Canadian executives 
or professionals may have driven the surge in top wage shares in Canada (while 
not affecting other countries such as France or Japan). If the migration threat 
explanation is valid, then this implies that the surge in top reported incomes in 
the United States since the 1970s must be real to a large extent and cannot be 
the consequence of changes in the way incomes are reported for tax purposes. 
The puzzle that still remains to be explained is why such a surge took place in 
the United States in the first place. 
The overall picture that emerges is that no deep technological forces 
underlying the process of development seem to be driving changes in inequality 
in Canada, as the famous Kuznets hypothesis suggested. On the contrary, World 
War II, the development of progressive taxation and changes in top income 
shares in the United States seem to be the most important factors that account 
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The Top 5% Income Share (P95-100) in Canada, 1920-2000
































































































The Income Shares of P90-95, P95-99, and P99-100 in Canada, 1920-2000
Source: Table 2, columns P90-95, P95-99, and P99-100. 



































































































The Income Shares of the Top Income Groups in Canada, 1920-2000
Source: Table 2, columns P99.9-100, and P99.99-100. 























































































































































































































Capital Income in the Corporate and the Personal Sector in Canada
Source: Authors' computations based on National Income and Expenditure Accounts, data from CANSIM (2003) with additional data provided by Statistics Canada. 
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Capital Income Domestic Dividends
30FIGURE 5
Income Composition of Top Groups within the Top Decile in 1946 and 2000
Capital income does not include capital gains.
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31FIGURE 6
The Top 10% Wage Income Share (P90-100) in Canada, 1972-2000































































































The Wage Income Shares of P90-95, P95-99, and P99-100 in Canada, 1972-2000





























































































The Top Wage Income Shares in Canada, 1972-2000
Source: Table 4, columns P99.9-100, and P99.99-100. 



























































































































































































































The Top 0.5% Wage Income Share in Canada and United States, 1972-2000
Source: Canada Table 4, column P99.5-100 
United States, Piketty and Saez (2003), Table IV, col. P99.5-100, updated to 2000














































































The Top 1% Wage Income Share of Quebec Francophones Versus 
All Filers from the Rest of Canada, 1982-2000








































































Francophones Canada excluding Quebec
36FIGURE 11
Marginal Income Tax Rates in Canada for Various Percentiles, 1920-2000
Source: Table E1, columns P90, P99, P99.9, P99.99, and Top, in Saez and Veall (2003).
Notes: Marginal tax rates include both federal and provincial taxes, as well as applicable surtaxes and credits
Year 1942 excluded because rates were reduced due to transition to a pay-as-you earn system 











































































































P90 P99 P99.9 P99.99 Top
37FIGURE 12
The Top 0.5% Income Share in Canada and the United States, 1920-2000
Source: Canada, Table 2, column P99.5-100
United States, Piketty and Saez (2003), Table II, col. P99.5-100, updated to 2000



































































































Thresholds Income level Fractiles




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Population 22,807,585 $24,859 
P90 $59,232 P90-95 1,140,379 $66,310
P95 $75,670 P95-99 912,303 $95,982
P99 $145,774 P99-99.5 114,038 $171,728
P99.5 $210,150 P99.5-99.9 91,230 $303,035
P99.9 $530,311 P99.9-99.99 20,527 $923,385
P99.99 $2,396,050 P99.99-100 2,281 $4,695,923
Notes: Computations based on income tax return statistics (see Saez and Veall, 2003, Appendix Section B)
Income is defined as annual gross income excluding capital gains and before individual taxes. 
Amounts are expressed in 2000 Canadian dollars. 1 US dollar = 1.5 Canadian dollar.
Source: Table A and Table B3, row 2000 in Saez and Veall (2003).
Thresholds and Average Incomes in Top Groups in Canada, 2000
39Population Average  Inflation
(aged 20+) Income CPI 
('000s) (2000 $) (2000 base) P90-100 P95-100 P99-100 P99.5-100P99.9-100P99.99-100 P90-95 P95-99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1920 4,990 4,980 11.894 32.60 14.40 10.49 5.36 2.10 18.19
1921 5,072 4,474 10.485 40.58 17.60 12.55 5.81 1.70 22.98
1922 5,163 4,987 9.604 34.34 15.17 10.74 5.04 1.63 19.17
1923 5,228 5,300 9.604 30.15 14.38 10.22 4.69 1.53 15.77
1924 5,321 5,242 9.427 30.65 14.53 10.39 4.89 1.63 16.11
1925 5,426 5,600 9.604 29.76 13.18 9.48 4.34 1.32 16.59
1926 5,528 5,944 9.604 30.15 14.01 10.22 4.81 1.57 16.14
1927 5,668 6,179 9.515 30.70 14.69 10.78 5.13 1.74 16.01
1928 5,810 6,474 9.515 31.31 15.32 11.23 5.29 1.75 16.00
1929 5,947 6,293 9.692 31.73 15.64 11.47 5.34 1.71 16.09
1930 6,074 5,831 9.604 32.74 16.10 11.86 5.68 1.84 16.63
1931 6,192 5,250 8.634 36.03 16.60 12.00 5.55 1.72 19.42
1932 6,317 4,674 7.841 39.42 17.67 12.72 5.98 1.90 21.75
1933 6,445 4,397 7.489 40.88 18.03 12.89 5.91 1.73 22.84
1934 6,564 4,755 7.577 39.11 17.50 12.59 5.86 1.84 21.61
1935 6,681 4,963 7.665 38.09 16.99 12.19 5.63 1.72 21.10
1936 6,786 5,132 7.753 38.35 17.45 12.67 6.00 1.91 20.90
1937 6,890 5,544 8.018 35.81 16.26 11.79 5.48 1.54 19.55
1938 6,999 5,494 8.106 39.55 18.41 13.31 6.05 1.87 21.15
1939 7,114 5,708 8.106 37.23 16.88 12.23 5.63 1.67 20.34
1940 7,229 6,278 8.370 33.68 14.71 10.35 4.52 1.53 18.97
1941 7,350 6,991 8.899 45.31 30.74 13.30 9.46 4.24 1.29 14.56 17.45
1942 7,492 8,383 9.251 39.56 26.42 11.30 8.01 3.53 1.06 13.14 15.13
1943 7,614 8,835 9.427 39.29 25.84 10.72 7.51 3.23 0.92 13.45 15.12
1944 7,730 9,473 9.515 37.38 24.49 10.01 6.95 2.92 0.82 12.89 14.48
1945 7,822 9,304 9.604 37.27 24.63 10.12 6.99 2.89 0.78 12.64 14.51
1946 7,971 9,037 9.868 37.75 25.30 10.72 7.42 3.02 0.79 12.45 14.57
1947 8,122 9,291 10.837 38.14 25.66 10.99 7.61 3.09 0.82 12.47 14.67
1948 8,266 9,314 12.335 36.68 24.49 10.39 7.20 2.94 0.71 12.19 14.10
1949 8,613 9,162 12.775 38.22 25.37 10.69 7.38 2.91 0.69 12.84 14.69
1950 8,758 9,328 13.128 38.24 25.45 10.88 7.58 3.06 0.74 12.79 14.57
1951 8,896 9,917 14.449 36.31 23.96 10.03 6.94 2.80 0.65 12.35 13.93
1952 9,129 10,285 14.890 36.44 23.91 9.85 6.75 2.71 0.67 12.52 14.07
1953 9,329 10,681 14.714 37.36 24.37 9.88 6.75 2.70 0.66 12.98 14.50
1954 9,548 10,378 14.802 38.68 25.29 10.33 7.10 2.82 0.71 13.39 14.96
1955 9,734 10,998 14.802 38.08 24.90 10.19 7.00 2.86 0.75 13.18 14.71
1956 9,911 11,806 15.066 37.22 24.19 9.63 6.57 2.63 0.65 13.04 14.56
1957 10,159 11,894 15.507 37.76 24.50 9.64 6.54 2.59 0.64 13.26 14.86
1958 10,352 11,920 15.859 38.39 25.00 9.89 6.68 2.62 0.64 13.39 15.11
1959 10,537 12,163 16.123 38.44 24.94 9.74 6.55 2.54 0.61 13.50 15.21
1960 10,700 12,406 16.300 38.78 25.13 9.77 6.56 2.52 0.61 13.65 15.36
1961 10,851 12,531 16.476 39.35 25.53 9.93 6.63 2.55 0.63 13.82 15.61
1962 11,001 13,337 16.652 37.77 24.42 9.37 6.23 2.33 0.54 13.36 15.05
1963 11,158 13,816 16.916 37.37 24.11 9.14 6.06 2.24 0.51 13.26 14.96
1964 11,354 14,330 17.269 37.77 24.43 9.38 6.24 2.33 0.54 13.34 15.05
1965 11,575 15,232 17.621 37.23 24.04 9.20 6.12 2.28 0.54 13.19 14.84
1966 11,845 16,106 18.326 36.76 23.70 8.91 5.88 2.16 0.49 13.06 14.80
1967 12,150 16,512 18.943 37.06 23.91 9.00 5.93 2.15 0.47 13.15 14.91
1968 12,451 16,909 19.736 37.31 24.02 9.04 5.96 2.17 0.47 13.28 14.99
1969 12,756 17,510 20.617 37.34 24.01 9.01 5.91 2.13 0.46 13.33 15.00
1970 13,064 17,760 21.322 37.92 24.22 8.97 5.87 2.07 0.43 13.69 15.25
1971 13,365 18,481 21.938 37.83 24.08 8.87 5.79 2.00 0.40 13.76 15.21
1972 13,659 19,488 22.996 37.55 23.84 8.75 5.74 2.02 0.43 13.71 15.09
1973 13,983 20,715 24.758 37.02 23.65 8.80 5.78 2.06 0.46 13.37 14.85
1974 14,353 21,611 27.401 37.38 23.82 8.81 5.76 2.09 0.48 13.57 15.01
1975 14,737 21,996 30.396 37.28 23.71 8.74 5.73 2.11 0.51 13.56 14.97
1976 15,101 22,781 32.687 36.74 22.99 8.08 5.21 1.88 0.44 13.75 14.91
1977 15,454 22,757 35.242 36.18 22.43 7.74 4.98 1.79 0.43 13.75 14.69
1978 15,787 22,786 38.414 35.77 22.17 7.60 4.90 1.77 0.44 13.60 14.57
1979 16,129 23,123 41.938 35.57 22.11 7.72 5.06 1.86 0.48 13.46 14.40
1980 16,524 23,202 46.167 36.23 22.68 8.06 5.27 1.97 0.53 13.56 14.62
1981 16,919 23,829 51.894 35.39 22.10 7.80 5.08 1.88 0.50 13.29 14.30
1982 17,299 22,875 57.533 36.24 22.92 8.46 5.66 2.33 0.68 13.32 14.47
1983 17,654 22,045 60.881 36.19 22.71 8.21 5.44 2.13 0.57 13.48 14.49
1984 17,998 22,480 63.524 35.78 22.48 8.29 5.55 2.28 0.68 13.30 14.20
1985 18,321 23,007 66.079 35.25 22.20 8.21 5.51 2.26 0.67 13.04 13.99
1986 18,628 23,243 68.811 35.22 22.22 8.24 5.52 2.24 0.64 13.00 13.97
1987 18,966 23,518 71.806 35.05 22.22 8.40 5.69 2.38 0.70 12.83 13.82
1988 19,278 24,507 74.714 35.66 23.11 9.34 6.54 3.00 1.01 12.55 13.77
1989 19,690 24,875 78.414 36.36 23.83 10.01 7.15 3.44 1.29 12.53 13.82
1990 20,030 24,877 82.203 35.54 23.08 9.35 6.55 2.98 1.01 12.46 13.73
1991 20,313 23,578 86.784 36.31 23.47 9.37 6.51 2.91 0.99 12.84 14.11
1992 20,579 23,195 88.106 36.72 23.60 9.31 6.44 2.82 0.94 13.12 14.29
1993 20,843 22,804 89.692 37.31 24.03 9.56 6.64 2.97 0.99 13.28 14.48
1994 21,115 22,989 89.868 37.49 24.16 9.59 6.65 2.94 0.95 13.33 14.57
1995 21,394 23,252 91.806 37.85 24.65 10.00 6.99 3.13 1.03 13.21 14.64
1996 21,667 23,171 93.304 38.77 25.48 10.62 7.53 3.47 1.14 13.29 14.85
1997 21,971 23,455 94.802 39.78 26.51 11.52 8.32 3.97 1.33 13.26 14.99
1998 22,241 23,955 95.683 40.61 27.35 12.18 8.87 4.34 1.48 13.26 15.17
1999 22,517 24,312 97.357 41.17 27.89 12.62 9.25 4.61 1.68 13.29 15.27
2000 22,808 24,859 100.000 42.34 29.01 13.56 10.11 5.23 1.89 13.34 15.44
Notes: See Appendix Sections A and B in Saez and Veall (2003) for details. Average income is estimated from National Income and Product Accounts.
Income is defined as income reported on personal income tax returns before all deductions and excluding realized capital gains.
Top income shares are estimated from on income tax return statistics and Pareto interpolations. 
Series for P90-95 are estimated only for the 1941-2000 period because the tax return population does not cover that group in the pre-war period.
Source: Tables A and B1 in Saez and Veall (2003)
Table 2: Top Income Shares in Canada, 1920-2000
Top Income Shares
40Wage Entrep. Capital Wage  Entrep. Capital Wage  Entrep. Capital Wage  Entrep. Capital Wage  Entrep. Capital Wage  Entrep. Capital
1946 88.7 8.6 2.7 79.6 15.5 4.9 55.7 32.8 11.5 45.8 36.9 17.4 36.5 36.8 26.7 27.2 19.9 53.0
1947 89.7 8.2 2.2 76.7 18.2 5.0 54.4 34.6 11.0 43.2 41.3 15.5 35.3 40.5 24.3 25.1 24.8 50.2
1948 90.0 8.0 2.0 76.7 18.4 4.9 52.5 36.2 11.3 44.1 40.1 15.9 36.7 37.3 26.1 28.2 27.2 44.6
1949 89.3 8.6 2.1 76.5 18.8 4.7 53.1 36.3 10.5 44.4 39.4 16.2 35.6 38.3 26.1 28.8 25.0 46.3
1950 89.5 8.4 2.1 77.2 17.6 5.2 53.2 35.5 11.3 44.1 38.7 17.1 34.5 38.9 26.6 32.3 25.1 42.6
1951 90.0 8.1 1.9 77.5 17.6 4.9 54.2 33.9 11.9 46.4 37.5 16.1 38.3 34.3 27.4 26.7 30.8 42.5
1952 90.3 7.6 2.1 78.9 16.6 4.5 53.9 34.6 11.6 46.0 37.8 16.2 38.6 33.1 28.3 28.0 23.4 48.7
1953 90.2 7.5 2.3 79.6 15.7 4.7 54.1 33.8 12.1 47.4 36.6 16.0 38.7 32.3 29.0 33.4 20.6 45.9
1954 91.6 6.3 2.2 81.8 13.3 4.8 58.0 29.9 12.1 49.4 33.6 17.0 39.8 29.2 31.1 30.3 25.2 44.5
1955 91.6 6.1 2.3 81.6 13.3 5.0 56.5 30.8 12.7 48.1 34.7 17.1 36.3 32.1 31.6 25.9 27.4 46.7
1956 91.4 6.4 2.2 81.6 13.6 4.7 55.9 32.2 11.9 47.7 35.5 16.9 39.7 32.4 27.9 26.2 29.9 43.9
1957 91.7 5.9 2.4 82.9 12.4 4.7 61.4 27.3 11.3 50.8 32.5 16.7 42.5 29.7 27.8 29.4 23.1 47.4
1958 90.9 6.6 2.5 80.4 14.1 5.5 60.7 27.5 11.9 49.8 33.0 17.2 43.2 29.0 27.8 30.0 19.2 50.8
1959 91.1 6.2 2.7 81.6 12.7 5.7 63.1 25.1 11.8 49.5 32.5 18.0 44.0 27.9 28.1 32.0 17.4 50.6
1960 91.1 6.0 2.9 81.6 12.4 6.0 65.7 22.3 12.0 50.1 31.2 18.7 43.5 27.7 28.8 31.0 15.8 53.2
1961 91.0 6.2 2.9 81.5 12.0 6.5 66.1 21.8 12.0 50.5 30.6 19.0 42.9 27.9 29.1 28.4 16.1 55.4
1962 91.1 6.0 2.9 81.6 12.0 6.5 66.1 21.6 12.3 50.4 30.4 19.2 43.3 27.9 28.8 30.3 17.1 52.7
1963 91.0 6.2 2.8 81.3 12.1 6.6 67.0 21.1 12.0 50.7 31.1 18.2 43.6 29.7 26.7 35.4 17.4 47.3
1964 90.7 6.3 3.1 80.3 12.9 6.8 64.0 23.1 12.9 50.2 31.2 18.5 43.5 29.7 26.8 32.5 17.5 50.1
1965 90.6 6.4 3.0 80.8 12.8 6.4 63.4 24.1 12.5 49.2 32.9 17.9 43.8 30.0 26.2 32.0 19.7 48.3
1966 90.5 6.4 3.1 81.0 12.6 6.4 64.1 23.5 12.4 50.5 32.2 17.4 45.2 29.8 25.0 31.8 17.3 50.9
1967 90.6 6.3 3.1 81.5 12.0 6.4 66.1 22.1 11.9 51.1 32.4 16.5 45.5 30.9 23.6 34.0 16.3 49.7
1968 91.0 5.4 3.7 82.7 10.4 6.9 68.5 19.3 12.3 51.8 31.8 16.4 45.2 31.4 23.4 35.0 18.2 46.9
1969 91.6 4.6 3.9 84.1 8.9 7.0 68.1 19.5 12.5 53.2 30.6 16.2 44.3 32.0 23.7 35.7 19.1 45.3
1970 91.7 4.1 4.2 85.2 7.8 7.0 67.5 19.3 13.1 53.6 29.9 16.5 41.4 35.0 23.6 33.0 19.8 47.2
1971 91.9 4.0 4.1 85.7 7.5 6.8 66.5 20.9 12.7 54.4 30.7 14.9 39.8 40.5 19.7 31.9 26.5 41.6
1972 91.7 4.3 4.0 84.8 8.3 6.9 68.4 19.6 12.0 50.9 33.6 15.5 42.4 36.9 20.7 40.5 19.3 40.2
1973 90.3 5.4 4.4 82.0 11.0 7.0 62.3 25.5 12.2 47.3 37.0 15.7 45.1 33.7 21.2 45.1 18.2 36.8
1974 89.5 5.3 5.2 79.4 12.1 8.5 59.0 27.1 13.9 44.5 38.0 17.6 45.0 31.5 23.5 45.4 15.1 39.5
1975 89.5 5.3 5.1 80.0 11.5 8.5 60.1 26.1 13.8 45.2 37.6 17.3 48.8 27.4 23.8 58.3 11.6 30.1
1976 89.8 4.7 5.5 82.7 9.0 8.3 62.6 23.2 14.2 46.0 35.3 18.6 47.4 27.1 25.5 49.5 15.3 35.2
1977 90.5 3.9 5.5 84.0 7.7 8.3 63.6 21.3 15.1 49.2 32.5 18.3 48.7 24.2 27.2 53.6 9.9 36.6
1978 89.5 4.1 6.4 81.0 8.4 10.6 57.9 21.7 20.3 49.5 27.1 23.4 46.4 18.9 34.7 49.7 8.2 42.1
1979 89.0 4.1 7.0 79.5 8.7 11.8 51.6 24.5 23.8 50.6 23.3 26.1 47.6 14.8 37.7 49.0 4.8 46.3
1980 87.8 3.7 8.5 77.9 8.4 13.7 57.9 19.0 23.2 53.1 19.1 27.8 48.2 11.6 40.2 50.0 4.5 45.6
1981 87.1 3.3 9.6 76.7 7.7 15.6 54.8 19.1 26.1 44.6 22.0 33.4 43.7 11.1 45.2 44.7 5.7 49.6
1982 87.4 2.8 9.8 79.2 6.1 14.7 61.6 16.2 22.2 49.1 23.4 27.5 50.7 11.9 37.4 47.1 2.4 50.6
1983 89.5 2.6 8.0 82.8 5.6 11.6 66.0 16.4 17.7 52.2 26.7 21.1 52.0 18.8 29.3 63.7 2.6 33.7
1984 90.2 2.7 7.1 84.3 5.5 10.2 67.5 16.8 15.7 52.9 28.7 18.5 54.4 20.6 25.0 59.8 1.1 39.2
1985 90.1 2.5 7.4 83.9 5.4 10.7 67.7 15.5 16.8 55.2 25.5 19.2 59.4 15.3 25.3 64.3 -1.2 37.0
1986 90.3 2.7 7.0 84.1 5.7 10.2 68.1 16.4 15.5 56.5 25.0 18.6 59.2 15.3 25.5 65.9 0.4 33.7
1987 90.7 2.9 6.5 84.2 5.8 10.0 66.7 16.6 16.7 57.5 24.3 18.3 63.4 13.9 22.7 68.9 0.8 30.4
1988 90.1 3.0 6.9 83.4 5.9 10.8 65.5 17.5 17.1 56.6 24.9 18.6 66.1 12.2 21.6 75.7 3.8 20.5
1989 89.4 3.0 7.6 81.9 6.2 11.9 62.3 18.7 19.0 52.6 26.0 21.4 62.6 12.3 25.1 72.5 4.6 22.8
1990 89.4 2.8 7.9 81.8 6.0 12.2 62.0 17.6 20.4 52.0 25.4 22.6 57.3 14.4 28.2 66.7 4.9 28.4
1991 90.5 2.4 7.2 83.2 5.5 11.3 63.4 17.1 19.5 52.3 26.4 21.3 57.8 15.8 26.4 63.6 3.9 32.5
1992 91.9 2.3 5.8 85.4 5.3 9.3 65.7 17.4 16.9 53.0 28.6 18.5 58.4 17.9 23.6 72.0 5.0 23.0
1993 92.1 2.5 5.5 85.5 5.4 9.0 66.1 17.3 16.6 53.9 29.0 17.1 63.2 16.3 20.5 79.6 2.3 18.1
1994 92.0 2.6 5.4 85.4 5.7 8.8 67.0 17.4 15.6 55.9 28.0 16.1 65.6 15.5 18.9 74.0 4.0 22.1
1995 91.1 2.9 6.0 83.8 6.2 10.1 65.5 17.3 17.2 55.9 27.5 16.6 65.7 14.4 19.9 74.1 3.7 22.2
1996 90.7 3.0 6.3 82.9 6.5 10.6 64.8 18.3 16.9 56.6 27.0 16.4 67.9 13.9 18.2 67.5 5.2 27.3
1997 91.0 3.2 5.8 83.5 6.9 9.6 65.5 19.3 15.2 57.6 26.8 15.7 70.1 13.3 16.6 72.6 3.0 24.4
1998 91.3 3.2 5.5 83.8 6.8 9.5 66.2 18.9 14.9 59.0 24.9 16.2 69.4 11.5 19.1 72.0 1.2 26.8
1999 90.9 3.3 5.8 83.7 7.0 9.3 66.8 18.6 14.5 59.8 24.6 15.6 68.7 12.9 18.4 67.0 2.5 30.5
2000 90.9 3.3 5.9 83.2 7.1 9.7 67.6 18.3 14.2 61.2 23.0 15.8 71.3 11.2 17.5 74.3 0.9 24.8
Notes: Fractiles defined by size of total income (excluding capital gains). For each fractile, the first three columns (summing to 100%) give the percentage of 
wage income (wages and salaries, stock options exercises, pensions, other employment income), entrepreneurial income (self-employment income, farm 
income, and small business income), and capital income (dividends, interest, rents, foreign and other investment income) in total income (excluding capital 
gains). Capital income does not include realized capital gains. Details on methodology are presented in Appendix Section C of Saez and Veall (2003).
Source: Computations based on tax return statistics reported in Table C3 in Saez and Veall (2003). 
Table 3: Income Composition in Top Income Groups, 1946-2000 
P99.9-99.99 P99.99-100 P90-95 P95-99 P99.5-99.9 P99-99.5
41Wage income Average 
earners wage income
('000s) (2000 $) P90-100 P95-100 P99-100 P99.5-100P99.9-100P99.99-100 P90-95 P95-99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1972 8,541 27,255 27.22 16.80 5.59 3.51 1.12 0.19 10.41 11.21
1973 8,955 27,933 27.31 16.93 5.79 3.69 1.24 0.23 10.38 11.14
1974 9,419 28,480 26.92 16.57 5.65 3.59 1.26 0.26 10.35 10.92
1975 9,648 29,135 26.97 16.56 5.76 3.70 1.40 0.32 10.41 10.80
1976 9,869 30,768 26.20 16.02 5.19 3.38 1.13 0.23 10.19 10.83
1977 10,014 30,945 26.10 15.79 5.04 3.25 1.10 0.23 10.31 10.75
1978 10,328 30,021 25.82 15.42 4.74 3.05 1.05 0.22 10.40 10.69
1979 10,772 29,625 26.30 15.74 5.09 3.25 1.10 0.23 10.56 10.65
1980 11,069 29,694 26.65 16.10 5.28 3.34 1.17 0.26 10.55 10.82
1981 11,420 29,232 26.44 15.79 4.94 3.10 1.08 0.24 10.65 10.85
1982 11,256 28,507 27.37 16.57 5.55 3.63 1.50 0.41 10.79 11.02
1983 11,185 28,160 27.52 16.59 5.54 3.63 1.49 0.42 10.92 11.05
1984 11,402 28,357 27.65 16.72 5.68 3.75 1.58 0.46 10.92 11.05
1985 11,582 28,549 27.80 16.89 5.84 3.91 1.68 0.51 10.91 11.05
1986 12,079 28,413 28.00 17.04 5.89 3.92 1.67 0.50 10.96 11.14
1987 12,312 28,547 28.28 17.35 6.21 4.21 1.85 0.55 10.94 11.14
1988 12,623 29,461 29.04 18.27 7.11 5.05 2.47 0.86 10.77 11.16
1989 12,962 29,836 29.43 18.70 7.55 5.47 2.80 1.10 10.73 11.15
1990 13,073 29,427 29.05 18.18 6.93 4.87 2.32 0.82 10.87 11.25
1991 12,916 28,683 29.22 18.21 6.80 4.73 2.20 0.75 11.01 11.41
1992 12,869 29,117 29.21 18.16 6.78 4.73 2.22 0.78 11.06 11.38
1993 12,903 29,011 29.59 18.51 7.11 5.04 2.46 0.86 11.08 11.41
1994 13,021 29,402 29.75 18.68 7.20 5.09 2.42 0.79 11.08 11.48
1995 13,195 29,443 30.15 19.10 7.59 5.38 2.57 0.84 11.06 11.51
1996 13,297 29,445 30.73 19.66 8.06 5.78 2.78 0.84 11.07 11.61
1997 13,615 29,932 31.66 20.64 8.90 6.56 3.30 1.08 11.02 11.74
1998 13,844 30,768 32.16 21.17 9.31 6.90 3.52 1.17 10.99 11.86
1999 14,233 31,183 32.35 21.40 9.48 7.02 3.58 1.21 10.95 11.92
2000 14,688 31,729 33.50 22.57 10.51 7.97 4.30 1.50 10.93 12.06
Notes: See Appendix Section D in Saez and Veall (2003) for details. Wage income earners is the number of individuals reporting positive wage income 
for personal income tax purposes.  Wage income includes wages and salaries, stock option exercises, and other employment income.
Top wage income shares are estimated from income tax return statistics and Pareto interpolations. 
Source: Tables D1 and D2 in Saez and Veall (2003)
Table 4: Top Wage Income Shares in Canada, 1972-2000
Top Wage Income Shares
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